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THE JAPANESE SCHOOL QUESTION AND THE
TREATY-MAKING POWER
Amos S. HERSHEY
Junior Professor of Political Science, Indiana University

The Japanese protest of October 23, 1906, against the
action of the San Francisco board of education, based on
a California statute requiring all children of Mongolian
descent to attend the school set apart for orientals, is one
of the most puzzling incidents in our recent diplomatic
history. It was sufficiently perplexing to the friends and
admirers of Japan to learn that her government had
created an international issue out of such a trivial matter
as the segregation of less than one hundred Japanese
pupils in the oriental school of San Francisco. But some
of the friends and supporters of the administration were
still more surprised to hear that the federal government
admitted that the treaty of 1894 with Japan had been
violated by this action of the San Francisco board of
education, and apparently believed that it had jurisdiction in the premises.
It is true that Secretary Metcalfe's report, which was
published on December 19, 1906, also informed us of a
considerable number of assaults on Japanese subjects by
"hoodlums and roughs," and of the breaking of windows
in Japanese restaurants in San Francisco. These attacks,
although subsequent to the earthquake, occurred at a
time of great public disorder during which there appears
to have been a carnival of crime when the police were
powerless to protect life and property; but they seem to
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have been directed against the Japanese from motives
of race prejudice, and not for the purpose of robbery.
Leaving out of question the slight boycott against
Japanese restaurants during the month of October, it
must be admitted that the government of Japan had
ample cause of complaint, if not, indeed, for a demand
for indemnity, in the attacks on Japanese property and
in the assaults on Japanese subjects committed during
the months of April to November, 1906.
The general principle of international law underlying
this matter is that in times of riot, disorder, insurrection,
or civil war, foreigners are merely entitled to the same
kind and degree of protection as is afforded to a State's
own citizens or subjects. But it is also now generally
admitted that a government is liable for injuries to aliens
resulting from attacks upon foreigners as such or upon
those of a particular nationality, wherever the local authorities are unable or unwilling to use due (?,.e., reasonable) diligence to prevent, and whenever the courts are
unable or unwilling to punish such crimes. It is true that
the government of the United States has always refused
to admit such liability in principle, but it is also true that
in the majority of actual cases our government has granted
compensation as a matter of grace and equity, or from a
sense of sympathy, policy, or benevolence. This was
notably the attitude of our government in the cases of the
anti-Spanish riots at New Orleans and Key West in 1851;
the anti-Chinese riot at Rock Springs, Wyoming, in 1885;
and the Italian lynchings at New Orleans in 1891. The
government of the United States has shown commendable zeal in protecting its citizens from such attacks
abroad, and other nations are in the habit of requesting
compensation in similar cases.
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" In attempting to secure redress or justice, aliens must,
however, in the first instance, have recourse to the local
tribunals of the district in which they are domiciled, or,
as Vattel puts it, to the 'judge of the place.' Judicial
remedies should, as a rule, be exhausted before resorting
to diplomatic interposition for means of procuring redress.
But this rule does not apply in case of a gross or palpable
denial of justice; where local remedies are wanting or
insufficient; where judicial action is waived; where the
action complained of is in violation of international law;
or where there is certain to be undue discrimination
against foreigners. It does not 'apply to countries of
imperfect civilization, or to cases in which prior proceedings show gross perversion of justice."'
It will thus be seen that a diplomatic protest at such
an early stage of the controversy would have been an unusual mode of procedure, even supposing that the action
complained of had been an injury to person or destruction of property of Japanese subjects. But the Japanese
government does not appear to have based its protest of
October 23 on this ground. It claimed that the treaty
rights of the Japanese had beeil infringed upon by the
action of the San Francisco board of education in ordering the segregation of all Japanese pupils in a separate
school set apart for orientals.
It may be observed in the first place that even total
exclusion of aliens from school privileges would in itself
in no wise onstitute a violation of international law.
In the absence of treaty stipulations, a State is under no
IMr. Evarts, Secretary of State, to Mr. Marsh. Wharton's Digest iii p. 695.
The whole paragraph is a citation from an article by the writer on "The Calvo
and Drago Doctrines" in the American Journal of InternationalLaw (vol. i, p. 32)
to which the reader is referred for a fuller discussion of these points with a citation
of authorities.
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international obligation to extend to foreigners the enjoyment of civil and private rights or to place them upon an
equal footing with its own nationals in these respects.
Whatever rights and privileges of this sort, whether of
an educational, economic, or religious nature, foreigners
may enjoy, are based on convention or the principle of
reciprocity, or are granted as a matter of grace and favor.
All that aliens who are permitted to reside on foreign
territory (and this permission is purely optional in the
absence of treaty stipulation) can demand as a matter of
strict right in international law is the same kind and
degree of protection of person and property that nationals
enjoy, and free access to the courts to secure such protection.
But it is claimed by Japan-and the claim seems to
have been largely admitted in this country-that by virtue of the treaty of 1894 the Japanese were entitled, not
merely to such protection, but to the same school privileges as citizens of the United States.
It is true that the treaty of 1894 grants to Japanese
residing or domiciled in this country certain reciprocal
rights and privileges relating to residence and travel; to
the possession, succession and transfer of property, etc.;
but there is no mention of school privileges. The following provisions of the treaty of 1894 have been cited
in support of the Japanese contention:
ARTICLE I. The citizens or subjects of each of the two
high contracting parties shall have full liberty to enter,
travel, or reside in any part of the territories of the other
contracting party, and shall enjoy full and perfect protection for their persons and property.
They shall have free access to the courts of justice in
pursuit and defense of their rights; they shall be at liberty
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equally with native citizens or subjects to choose and
employ lawyers, advocates, and representatives to pursue and defend their rights before such courts, and in all
other matters connected with the administration of justice
they shall enjoy all the rights and privileges enjoyed by
native citizens or subjects.
In whatever relates to rights of residence and travel;
to the possession of goods and effects of any kind; to the
succession to personal estate, by will or otherwise, and
the disposal of property of any sort and in any manner
whatsoever which they may lawfully acquire, the citizens
or subjects of each contracting party shall enjoy in the
territories of the other the same privileges, liberties, and
rights, and shall be subject to no higher imposts or charges
in these respects than native citizens or subjects or citizens or subjects of the most favored nation. * * *
ARTICLE II. There shall be reciprocal freedom of commerce and navigation between the territories of the two
high contracting parties. * * *

It is, however, understood that the stipulations contained in this and the preceding article do not in any
way -affect the laws, ordinances and regulations with
regard to trade, the immigration of laborers, police and
public security which are in force or which may hereafter
be enacted in either of the two countries.
ARTICLE XIV. The high contracting parties agree that,
in all that concerns commerce and navigation, any privilege, favor, or immunity which either high contracting
party has actually granted,. or may hereafter grant, to
the government, ships, citizens, or subjects of any other
State, shall be extended to the government, ships, citizens, or subjects of the other high contracting party,
gratuitously, if the concession in favor of that other
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State shall have been gratuitous, and on the same or
equivalent conditions if the concession shall have been
conditional; it being their intention that the trade and
navigation of each country shall be placed, in all respects,
by the other upon the footing of the most favored nation.
It is difficult to see how any clause in this treaty can be
stretched to cover the Japanese contention. As Senator
Rayner observed in his speech in the United States senate
on December 12, 1906: "There is not a clause or a line
of this treaty that contains by expression or intendment
the slightest reference to the public school systems of
any of the States of the Union, or confers any rights whatever upon the citizens of Japan to enjoy the privileges
of their public educational institutions. There is not a
clause or a line, although I understand that the president
has been advised to the contrary, that, to the professional
mind, would admit of such a construction. The most
liberal interpretation of any of its terms does not allow
such an interpolation or insertion to be made. The treaty
does not even contain the most favored nation clause,
except in reference to the particular objects that are
therein specifically enumerated."
The Burlingame treaty of 1868 with China, contains an
article (Art. VII.) which provides for reciprocal school
privileges in all "public educational institutions under
the control of the governments of China and the United
States;" but it is obvious that the school privileges
acquired by the Chinese in the United States as a consequence of this treaty were not extensive. At any rate,
this provision in the treaty with China has not prevented
the segregation of Chinese school children in the oriental
school of San Francisco. Nor can it be claimed that it
gives the Japanese any educational privileges by virtue
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of the most favored nation clause, for that clause is
specifically restricted to matters relating to residence and
travel, property, and to trade and navigation. Besides,
it "does not cover privileges granted on the condition
of a reciprocal advantage."
It has been suggested that the right of education might
possibly be included under the right of residence, but this
is a forced extension of the meaning of the word residence,
for which, so far as the writer is aware, there is no authority whatever. It has been held that the right of residence
necessarily implies the right to live and labor for a living
(Baker v. City of Portland, U. S. Circuit Court, 1879,
5 Sawyer 566, 570), but it has also been held that such
right to live and labor does not prevent the municipal
regulation of public laundries. (Barbier v. Connolly,
1885, 113 U. S. 27.)
Special attention should be called to the fact that
Article II. of the treaty provides that the previous stipulations do not "affect the laws, ordinances, and regulations with regard to trade, the immigration of laborers,
police and public security" which were then in force or
which might thereafter be enacted. The police powers
of the State and federal government as well as the right
to regulate immigration were thus expressly reserved.
But it seems to have been assumed by those who
favored the Japanese contention that in some mysterious
way and for some unexplained reason the treaty cited
above confers school privileges in the States upon the
Japanese. Even if this were the case, it by no means
follows that such a provision would be constitutional or
that, if constitutional, Japanese children could not be
2 On the meaning and interpretation of the most favored nation clause, see
Moore's Digest of International Law, v, §765.
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segregated in separate schools. The children of our own
colored citizens are thus separated in many localities
(in the northern as well as the eastern States), and the
right thus to segregate the two races has been upheld by
numerous decisions of State courts and has been approved
by the Supreme Court of the United States (see Plessy v.
Ferguson, 1896, 163 U. S. 537, and the cases there cited).
And it can scarcely be maintained that aliens enjoy
greater privileges than our own citizens in these respects.
It is well known that students of the Constitution of the
United States have always been divided into two opposing parties-the broad constructionists and the strict
constructionists.
These schools have always differed
in fundamental attitude toward the Constitution as
well as in mode of construction and interpretation.
This difference is also manifest in their attitude toward
the question of the extent and scope of the treaty-making power.
The opinion of those who hold that the treaty-making
power of the United States is practically unlimited is
perhaps best expressed by Charles Henry Butler (TreatyMaking Power of the United States, vol. i, pp. 5-6):
"First: That the treaty-making power of the United
States, as vested in the central government, is derived
not only from the powers expressly conferred by the Constitution, but that it is also possessed by that government as an attribute of sovereignty, and that it extends to
every subject which can be the basis of negotiation and
contract between any of the sovereign powers of the
world, or in regard to which the several States of the
Union themselves could have negotiated and contracted
if the Constitution had not expressly prohibited the States
from exercising the treaty-making power in any manner
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whatever and vested that power exclusively in, and
expressly delegated it to the federal government.
"Second: * * * That the power of the United States

to enter into treaty stipulations in regard to all matters,
which can properly be the subject of negotiation between
sovereign States, is practically unlimited, and that in no
case is the sanction, aid or consent of any State necessary
to validate the treaty or to enforce its provisions.
"Third: That the power to legislate in regard to all
matters affected by treaty stipulations and relations is
coextensive with the treaty-making power, and that acts
of congress enforcing such stipulations which, in the
absence of treaty stipulations, would be unconstitutional
as infringing upon the powers reserved to the States, are
constitutional, and can be enforced, even though they
may conflict with State laws or provisions of State constitutions.
"Fourth: That all provisions in State statutes or constitutions which in any way conflict with any treaty stipulations, whether they have been made prior or subsequent thereto, must give way to the provisions of the
treaty, or act of congress based on and enforcing the same,
even if such provisions relate to matters wholly within
State jurisdiction."
On the other hand, the views of the strict constructionists find their best expression in a report from the house
judiciary committee bearing on the treaty of reciprocity
with the Hawaiian Islands in 1887, prepared by John
Randolph Tucker (see House Doc. of 49th Congress, 2d
Session, March 3, 1887, Report No. 4177, pp. 4-5):
" The language of the Constitution of the United States
which gives the character of 'supreme law' to a treaty,
confines it to 'treaties made under the authority of the
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United States.' That authority is limited and defined
by the Constitution itself. The United States has no
unlimited, but only delegated authority. The power to
make treaties is bounded by the same limits which are
prescribed for the authority delegated to the United
States by the Constitution. To suppose that a power to
make treaties with foreign nations is unlimited by the
restraints imposed on the power delegated to the United
States would be to assume that by such treaty the Constitution itself might be abrogated and the liberty of the
people secured thereby destroyed. The power to contract must be commensurate with and not transcend the
powers by virtue of which the United States and their
government exist and act. It cannot contract with a
foreign nation to do what is unauthorized or forbidden
by the Constitution to be done. The power to contract is
limited by the power to do. (3 Story, Com. on Const.,
§1501.)
"It is on this principle that a treaty can not take away
essential liberties secured by the Constitution to the
people. The treaty power must be subordinate to these.
A treaty cannot alien a State or dismember the Union,
because the Constitution forbids both.
"In all such cases the legitimate effect of a treaty is to
bind the United States to do what they are competent
to do and no more. The United States by treaty can
only agree with another nation to perform what they have
authority to perform under the constitutional charter
creating them. The treaty makes the nexus which binds
the faith of the Union to do what their Constitution gives
authority to do. A treaty made under that authority may
do this; all it attempts to do beyond it is ultra vires-is
null, and cannot bind them. "
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The time for pronouncing upon the relative merits of
the theories or doctrines of these opposing schools of constitutional construction seems to have passed, for the
broad constructionists appear to have practically won the
battle all along the line. Although an act of congress
renders a prior inconsistent treaty null and void, it has
been held again and again both by State and federal
courts (including the Supreme Court of the United States)
that any treaty made "under the authority of the United
States, " is " the supreme law of the land, " and that the
"judges in every State " are " bound thereby, anything
in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding. "
The strongest cases in support of this contention are
those in which it has been held that State laws which
interfere with the rights of aliens to hold and transmit
real property are null and void when such rights have
been granted by treaty (see Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat
259; Carmeal v. Banks, 10 Wheat. 181; Hauenstein v.
Lynham 100 U. S. 483, etc.) But this is no serious invasion of the police power or reserved rights of the States,
inasmuch as only a comparatively small amount of property is affected by these decisions. Besides, reciprocal
privileges of this nature are very frequently the subject
of negotiation, and the federal government would be
greatly embarrassed by a lack of power to grant them.
This is not the case with educational privileges which are
seldom the subject of negotiation. Yet Secretary Bayard
said in 1886: "Were the question whether a treaty provision which gives to aliens rights to real estate in the
United States to come up now for the first time, grave
doubts might be entertained as to how far such a treaty
would be constitutional. "'
I Moore, Digest, v, §738, p. 178.
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That the treaty-making power is not absolutely unlimited is admitted by the broadest constructionists with
perhaps one or two exceptions. Even Butler (TreatyMaking Power, ii, p. 350) admits that "the fact that the
United States is a constitutional government precludes
the idea of any absolutely unlimited power existing. The
Supreme Court has declared that it must be admitted as
to every power of society over its members that it is not
absolute and unlimited; and this rule applies to the exercise of the treaty-making power as it does to every other
power vested in the central government. The question
is not whether the power is limited or unlimited, but at
what point do the limitations begin."
The strongest opinion in favor of the unlimited extent
of the treaty-making power is that of Justice Chase in the
case of Ware v. Hylton (3 Dall. 236), in 1796. It is as
follows:
"There can be no limitation on the power of the people
of the United States. By their authority the State constitutions were made, and by their authority the Constitution of the United States was established; and they had
the power to change or abolish the State constitutions,
or to make them yield to the general government and to
treaties made by their authority. A treaty cannot be
the supreme law of the land, that is, of all the United
States, if any act of a State legislature can stand in its
way. If the constitution of a State (which is the fundamental law of the State, and paramount to its legislature)
must give way to a treaty, and fall before it; can it be
questioned whether the less power, an act of the State
legislature, must not be prostrate? It is the declared
will of the people of the United States that every treaty
made by the authority of the United States shall be supe-
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rior to the constitution and laws of any individual State;
and their will alone is to decide. If a law of a State contrary to a treaty is not void, but voidable only by a repeal
or nullification of a State legislature, this certain consequence follows: that the will of a small part of the United
States may control or defeat the will of the whole.
The people of America have been pleased to declare, that
all treaties made before the establishment of the national
Constitution,or laws of any of the States, contrary to a treaty,
shall be disregarded."
This opinion of Justice Chase in Ware v. Hylton was
quoted by Justice Swayne in Hauenstein v. Lynham (100
U. S. 483), in 1879, in favor of the view that a State law
must give way to a treaty; but it is well to call special
attention to the fact that Justice Swayne omitted the
last sentence (which I have for this reason placed in italics) of the quotation given above. This omission has
been the source of much misunderstanding and misrepresentation resulting in an exaggerated view of the real
value and importance of the case of Ware v. Hylton as a
precedent; for anyone who merely takes the trouble to
read the syllabus of that case can readily see that it covers
the real point of the decision. All else is obiter.
It is, however, only fair to Justice Swayne to point out
that he explicitly stated that he did not " concur in everything said in the extract." He had declared in 1870:
"It need hardly be said that a treaty cannot change the
Constitution or be held valid if it be in violation of that
instrument." (The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wallace, 616.
See also his opinion in U. S. v. Rhodes, U. S. Circuit
Court, 1866, U. S. Rep. 28 at p. 43.) Even Justice Chase
does not say that a treaty may override the Constitution
of the United States.
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The writer knows of no justice of the Supreme Court who
states the theory of the unlimited extent of the treatymaking power in such unqualified terms as did Justice
Chase in the case of Ware v. Hylton. Justice Field (in
Geoffrey v. Riggs, 133 U. S., 258) did not believe that the
treaty-making power of the United States extended so
far as to " authorize what the Constitution forbids, or
a change in the character of the government or in that
of one of the States." In the License Cases of 1847 (5
Howard 613) Justice Daniel even maintained that " treaties, to be valid, must be made within the scope of powers
vested by the Constitution; for there can be no 'authority
of the United States,' save what is derived mediately or
immediately, and regularly and legitimately, from the
constitution. A treaty, no more than an ordinary statute, can arbitrarily cede away one right of a State
any citizen of a State." In the Passenger Cases of 1849
(7 Howard 466), Chief Justice Taney gave it as his
opinion that "if the people of the several States of
this Union reserved to themselves the power of expelling from their borders any person, or class of persons
whom it might deem dangerous to its peace, or likely
to produce a physical or moral evil among its citizens,
then any treaty or law of congress invading this right, and
authorizing the introduction of any person or description
of persons against the consent of the State, would be an
usurpation of power which this court would neither
recognize nor enforce." He added: " I had supposed
this question not now open to dispute." Although
these opinions are clearly obiter dicta, and no treaty
has ever been declared void and unconstitutional by
any federal court, this is probably only because no
case has arisen calling for such a decision.
The courts
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are naturally extremely reluctant to embarrass the federal government in the exercise of the treaty-making
power,4 and our government has been very careful to
keep within the scope of its powers in the negotiation
of treaties. Thus, in 1899, the Department of State
declined a proposal of the British government to negotiate a treaty to prevent discriminatory legislation by the
States, subjecting foreign fire-insurance companies to
higher taxes than domestic companies, on the ground
that the people of the United States were indisposed to
permit any encroachment upon the exercise of their
powers of local legislation.5
Among American statesmen who have placed themselves on record in favor of the principle that "the Constitution is to prevail over a treaty where the provisions
of the one come in conflict with the other" are Jefferson,
Gallatin, Adams, Calhoun, Marcy, Blaine, and Bayard.6
In his Treaty-Making Power7 Butler informs us that
there are numerous cases in which both State and federal
courts have refused to construe a treaty so that it renders
State legislation inoperative.
"The New York court of appeals held that a statute
preventing intrusions on Indian lands within the State
did not interfere with the obligations of the treaty of 1842
with the Seneca Indians, but that it was within the
police power of the State, and that the State could not be
I In Ware v. Hylton (3 Dall. 237), Justice Chase, the strongest champion of the
treaty-making power in the history of the United States Supreme Court, expressly
declined to give an opinion as to whether a treaty could override the Constitution.
He added: " If the court possesses the power to declare treaties void, I shall never
exercise it, but in a very clear case indeed."
8
Moore, Digest, v, §735, pp. 164-165.
oMoore, v, §§735-736.
'§356.

408

THE AMERICAN

POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

barred from the proper exercise of police powers to maintain and to preserve the peace.
"The Supreme Court of the United States sustained
the court of appeals in this case (Cutler v. Dibble, 21
Howard, 366).
"It was also held that the State dispensary statute
of South Carolina did not interfere with the rights of
Italian citzens to freely carry on business in this country
under the stipulations in the treaty of 1871 with Italy.
There are other cases in which State laws have been
upheld, including statutes establishing quarantine and
health regulations, succession taxes, punishment of crimes,
and proving title to grants in States carved out of
ceded territory. "8

The extent of the police powers and reserved rights
of a State may be seen by consulting the Slaughter
House Cases of 1872 (16 Wallace, 36) and the Lousiana
Succession Tax Cases (see Prevost v. Greneaux, 19 Howard, 1; Frederickson v. State of Louisiana, 23 Howard,
445, etc.) Speaking of these decisions, Butler, the
leading champion of the unlimited extent of the treatymaking power of the United States government, says
(ii, p. 56): "The Supreme Court has, in regard to
treaties, as it has in regard to federal statutes, ever
kept in view the exclusive right of States to regulate
their internal affairs and has not allowed either treaty
stipulations or federal statutes to be so construed as
to prevent the proper exercise of police powers."
In People v. Gallagher (93 N. Y. Rep. 447) it was held
that "the privilege of receiving an education at the
expense of the State, being created and conferred solely
I See Butler's Treaty-Making Power, ii, pp. 48-56 and notes, for a digest of a
number of such cases.
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by the laws of the State, and always subject to its
discretionary regulation, might be granted or refused
to any individual or class at the pleasure of the State."
This view of the question was also taken in State, ex rel.
Games v. McCann (21 Ohio St. 198) and Cary v. Carter
(48 Ind. 327).
The writer, although by no means a strict constructionist, does not believe that the federal government has
the right, by treaty or otherwise, to encroach upon the
police power or reserved rights of the States to the extent
of directing or controlling their public school systems. If
there are any constitutional limitations upon the treatymaking power, if the States retain any autonomy whatsoever, they surely preserve a right to the exclusive control of the schools which they maintain out of their resources. What greater trespass upon the province of
self-government, what more serious violation of fundamental rights can be imagined than federal interference
with a State's management of its own schools? If our
federal government should barter away such fundamental
rights as these, and the courts hold such action constitutional, then the double structure of State and federal
government which our fathers reared will crumble into
ruins, and a new centralized edifice will take its place in
which the States will be reduced to mere provinces or
adminstrative units.

